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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
The shotgun approach used by the majority renders the opinion somewhat
confusing in that no one set of facts can be pointed to as a basis for voiding.the
ordinance and thus it is difficult to determine exactly what type of test was
applied. In contrast, the logic of the dissent is clear and cogent. The result
reached by the majority is probably the more desirable when viewed with a
practical eye, but such an approach is fraught with the dangers which arise from
flexible judicial determinations.
Consfifufionalify Of Minimum Wage Law Provision
Article 19 of the Labor Law35 sets forth the law concerning minimum wage
'standards for women and minors the purpose of which is to provide adequate
maintenance for and to protect the health of women and minors. Section 663 (a)
of that article is a supplemental provision designed to effectuate the aim of the
whole article by protecting the minimum wage standards established for women
and minors. It is therein declared that no male twenty-one years of age or over
shall be employed in an occupation at less than the minimum wage standards
fixed for women and minors in that occupation. The purpose of this section is
dearly to prevent unemployment of this protected class because of wage compe-
tition from men.
The constitutionality of this section was challenged for the first time in
N. H. Lyons & Co. v. Corsi38 Plaintiff brought action for an injunction and a
judgment declaring invalid an order of the Industrial Commissioner establishing
minimum wages for women and minors in the hotel industry. He claimed that the
enforcement of a minimum wage under §663 (a) for the men he employed in his
cheap "flophouse" where the employment of women was forbidden by municipal
regulation was unconstitutional as a general minimum wage act for men, or, in
the alternative, that this section was unconstitutional as applied to him. The Court
of Appeals,3 7 affirming the lower courts' decisions,38 held that §663 (a) was not a
general minimum wage act for men, and that any objection as to application
should have been appealed under §662 of the act.39
While it can no longer be disputed that a general minimum wage law for
men is constitutional,40 it remains that this is not such a wage law since it affects
men only in those occupations where a minimum wage rate for women and minors
has been established. However, this section, as the Court found, has a reasonable
relation to the enforcement of the general policy of protecting women and minors
35. N.Y. LABoR LAW §§650-666.
36. 3 N.Y.2d 60, 163 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1957).
37. Ibid.
38. 203 Misc. 160, 116 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1955); 286 App. Div. 1065, 146
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1st Dep't 1955).
39. N.Y. LABOR LAW §662.
40. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
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in industry. A similar result was reached in Lincoln Candies v. Department of
Labor' where the setting of minimum hours per week for women was held
constitutional as a means to effectuate the policy of article 19 of the Labor Law.42
Since this statute is not unconstitutional on its face, the only issue remaining
is whether it is unconstitutional in its appIcation to plaintiff. The Court of
Appeals refused to decde this issue because the plaintiff had not exhausted his
remedies under the act. Section 66 2 4a allows matters of law to be reviewed by the
Board of Standards and Appeals as provided in §11044 which states that matters
of validity and reasonableness shall be proper for that Board's review. Thereafter
appeals from that determination can be taken direct to the Appellate Division,
third Department. Due to the plaintiff's failure to seek relief under these sections
before appealing to the Court of Appeals, that body followed the well-established
rule that constitutional issues will not be decided unless there are no other
grounds on which to disposes of the case in controversy.4 1
The dissent would have decided the constitutional question as to application
in favor of the plaintiff in this instance instead of relegating him to his remedy
under the statute.
In the light of the prevailing doctrine in the federal as well as the state
courts to avoid constitutional issues if possible,4" the majority's approach to this
problem is the more acceptible.
Invoking Privilege Againsf Self Incriminaion-Grounds For Discharge
A controversial area of law today is the extent of the protection given by
the courts to a party who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.
Although the basic merits of the privilege have been questioned,4 7 the right seems
firmly entrenched in our legal system.48 Dean Griswold has called it "one of the
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."49
Due process considerations were present in Lerner v. Casey,00 where petitioner
41. 289 N.Y. 262, 45 N.E.2d 434 (1942).
42. See note 35 supra.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. N.Y. LABOR LAw §110.
45. Schieffelin v. Goldsmith, 253 N.Y. 243, 170 N.E. 905 (1930); O'Kane v.
State, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E.2d 905 (1940).
46. Ibid; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Drisco]l v. Edison
Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1938).
47. 74 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1925). For a discussion of the privileges against
self-incrimination, see 6 BUFFALO L. Rsv. 343 (1957).
48. 24 FORDHAM' L. REV. 19 (1955); see Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225
(1st Cir. 1954).
49. GRISWOLD. THiE FiTE AmENDMTENT TODAY, 7 (1955).
50. 2 N.Y.2d 355, 161 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1957).
